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TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - CAPITAL GAIN TREATMENT OF 
AMOUNT RECEIVED FROM SUBLESSEE BY LESSEE-SUBLESSOR FOR SURRENDER OF 
LEASE To LESSOR-The lessor and the sublessee of a valuable piece of busi-
ness property sought to remove the intervening interest of petitioner, the 
lessee-sublessor. Petitioner agreed to release to the lessor all his right and 
interest in the leasehold and in consideration therefor petitioner received 
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a sum of money from the sublessee. The Tax Court1 decided in a 
deficiency proceeding that the entire amount should be taxed as ordinary 
income on the ground that it was merely a substitute for future rental 
payments. On appeal, held, reversed. Since the substance of the transaction 
was the transfer of the leasehold from the lessee to the lessor there was 
a sale of a capital asset and the sum was taxable as capital gain under the 
predecessor of section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 
Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960). 
Subchapter P of the 1954 Code3 generally defines and delimits the 
area in which capital gains treatment will be applied. To be entitled 
to such preferential treatment4 two requirements must be met: the object 
of a given transaction must fall within the Code definition of a "capital 
asset";5 and, there must be a "sale or exchange" of the object. The 
capital-asset requirement has been considered by some authorities as 
the most important control point in screening the increasing flood of 
attempts to secure the preferential tax treatment accorded capital gains.6 
However, in the area of leaseholds and analogous interests in real prop-
erty it seems settled that these interests generally qualify as "capital assets."1 
The major interpretative problem in leasehold cases is whether a 
transaction constitutes a "sale or exchange." Two aspects of this problem 
require consideration in connection with the principal case. The first 
is whether the "sale or exchange" prerequisite to capital gains treatment 
can be satisfied by either party to a transaction involving the transfer of 
a leasehold interest. In 1941 the Supreme Court held that a lessor had 
not met the capital gains requirements when he received payment in 
consideration for the release of his lessee from all obligations under the 
lease.8 The Court reasoned that since the lessor had not given up any 
1 Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 31 T.C. 971 (1959). 
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (j), added by ch. 619, § 151, 56 Stat. 846 (1942). 
3 The equivalent area was covered by Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 
50, as amended. 
4 "The capital gains provisions in the income tax law are remedial provisions and 
were intended by Congress to alleviate the burden on a taxpayer where the property 
has increased in value over a long period of time, for having profits from sales taxed 
at graduated tax rates designed for a single year's income •••• " Martin v. United States, 
119 F. Supp. 468, 473 (N.D. Ga. 1954). 
5 INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §§ 1221, 1222, 1231. 
o 3B MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 22.11 at 56 (rev. ed. 1958); see, 
e.g., Mansfield Journal Co. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1960); Bidart 
Bros. v. United States, 262 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1003 (1959). 
But see Commissioner v. Pittston, 252 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), 
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919 (1958). 
'1 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Goff, 212 F.2d 875 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 
(1954) ; Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 
939 (1953). See generally 6 VAND. L. REv. 933 (1953). 
8 Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). 
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interest in the property the payment could not be connected with a 
"sale or exchange" but was a substitute for future rent. Two years later, 
the Board of Tax Appeals settled the question as to the lessee by deciding 
there had been a "sale" when he transferred all his interest in the property 
to a third party in return for a sum of money.9 Since the lessee is capable 
of achieving capital-gain status under certain circumstances the second 
part of the problem is whether he can realize capital gain if he gives up 
his interest to the lessor. Using the analogous authority of three leading 
cases10 which had held that the relinquishment of life interests in trusts 
to the remaindermen were "sales," the Third Circuit ruled a lump-
sum payment received by the lessee from his lessor for cancellation of 
the lease was the product of a "sale" and therefore a capital gain.11 
Subsequently, this holding was codified by Congress,12 thereby resolving 
all doubts concerning the second aspect of the "sale or exchange" prob-
lem. Congress, however, specifically negated any implication that the 
codification was to affect the situation in which the lessor received the 
payment.13 The primary point of contention in the principal case was 
whether the petitioner, the lessee-sublessor, had received the payment in 
his capacity as lessee or lessor. The key to this determination seems to be 
whether he gave up his interest in the property in consideration of the 
payment. If he did, he would be receiving it as a lessee. The Tax Court 
indicated the release of the right to future rental income was the primary 
purpose of the transaction; the transfer of the underlying leasehold was 
deemed merely incidental. The court acknowledged that if petitioner had 
been able to prove that a part of the sum had been received for the 
transfer of the leasehold, that part of the consideration could have been 
treated as capital gain. Since he had failed to establish such an ap-
portionment to the satisfaction of the court, the entire payment was 
considered to be for the cancellation of the sublease which did not 
involve petitioner's relinquishment of his interest in the property, anq 
the sum was treated as ordinary income. The court of appeals, on the 
other hand, concluded that since the lessor and sublessee wished to remove 
petitioner's intervening interest so they could enter into a mutually 
profitable long-term arrangement, petitioner was in a position of 
practical advantage and the "lease clearly had value over the amount of 
o Walter H. Sutliff, 46 B.T .A. 446 (1942) • 
10 Allen v. First Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946) , cert. denied, 
330 U.S. 828 (1947); McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. 
denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947); Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943). 
11 Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 
(1953). 
12 INT, R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 1241. 
13 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 444 (1954) • 
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rentals due ... "14 under the sublease. Therefore, the court reasoned 
that the transfer covered the entire leasehold and the payment to petitioner 
was received by him in his capacity as a surrendering lessee. The fact 
that the payor was the party who was being relieved of the obligation to 
pay rent was not a sufficiently important factor to convince the court 
that the amount paid was merely a substitute for rent. Once it is 
determined that the petitioner has received payment in his capacity as 
a lessee, the statutory provision becomes applicable and the payment is 
treated as the product of a "sale" and is a capital gain. 
It appears that the view taken by the court of appeals was more 
realistic than that of the Tax Court. The mere cancellation of the 
sublease and the accompanying liquidation of the right to future 
income was not the essence of the agreement. Obviously, the parties' 
purpose would have been frustrated had there been no transfer of the 
underlying leasehold. No matter how it was measured and who was paying 
it, the sum given to petitioner was in consideration of the disposition 
of his entire interest in the income-producing property.15 
However, it might be argued that in the principal case there were two 
transactions-a payment in lieu of rent, and a "sale" of the leasehold. 
Arguably, that part of the total amount which was a substitute for future 
rent due under the sublease could be ordinary income, and only the 
excess capital gain. The proof problems implicit in this approach may be 
troublesome, but they seem surmountable. The total amount of rent 
due is clearly calculable since the length of the sublease and the amounts 
of all future payments were fixed. This figure could be adjusted to take 
into account the accelerated method of payment and the balance would 
represent the amount to be treated as capital gain. As the Tax Court 
mentioned in dictum, this appears to be a legitimate approach and it 
would serve to limit the application of preferential tax treatment to that 
sum which represents the "sale" price of the capital asset. Militating 
against this approach, however, is the recent decision of the Third Circuit 
which provided that "for tax purposes such anticipated earnings . . • 
are treated as merely enhancing the value of the income producing 
property and, therefore, are not differentiated from the capital gain 
realized in the sale of the underlying capital asset."16 In view of the 
fairly general acceptance of this view17 and of the judicial trend to expand 
the application of the capital gains provisions, the court's conclusion in 
the principal case, at least as a technical matter, seems to be the more 
14 Principal case at 594. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Rosen v. United States, 288 F.2d 658, 661 n.2 (3d Cir. 1961). 
17 See Levy, The Line Between a Sale of Property and the Anticipation of Ordinary 
Income, N.Y.U. 7TH INST. ON FED. TAX 399 (1949). 
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sound. Whether this result accords with the best public policy is a 
question better suited, at this advanced stage in the judicial treatment 
of the area, to legislative consideration.18 
Paul Tractenberg 
18 See generally 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86m CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX 
REVISION COMPENDIUM 1193-1301 (1959). 
